

THE IMPACT OF AGRICULTURAL GUEST WORKER PROGRAMS  
**ON ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION**


BY STUART ANDERSON

THE NATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR AMERICAN POLICY

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**NOVEMBER 2003**

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

An understanding that the bracero program played a key role in reducing illegal immigration has remained absent in the debate over both immigration policy and agricultural guest workers. In varying forms from 1942-1964, the bracero program allowed the admission of Mexican farm workers to be employed as seasonal contract labor for U.S. growers and farmers. Although facilitating legal entry for agricultural work proved effective, today, the idea of allowing regulated, legal entry that employs market principles to fulfill labor demand otherwise filled by individuals entering illegally is considered, depending on one's viewpoint, either novel, radical, or bold.

Based upon the research, this report concludes:

- By providing a legal path to entry for Mexican farm workers the bracero program significantly reduced illegal immigration. The end of the bracero program in 1964 (and its curtailment in 1960) saw the beginning of the increases in illegal immigration that we see up to the present day.
- It is recognized that the number of INS apprehensions are an important indicator of the illegal flow and that, in general, apprehension numbers drop when the flow of illegal immigration decreases. The data show that after the 1954 enforcement actions were combined with an increase in the use of the bracero program, INS apprehensions fell from the 1953 level of 885,587 to as low as 45,336 in 1959 – *indicating, based on apprehensions data, a 95 percent reduction in the flow of illegal immigration into the United States.* During that time, the annual number of Mexican farm workers legally admitted more than doubled from 201,380 in 1953 to an average of 437,937 for the years 1956-1959. In addition, the number of Mexicans admitted as permanent residents (green card holders) increased from 18,454 in 1953 to an average of 42,949 between 1955 and 1959.
- "Without question the bracero program was . . . instrumental in ending the illegal alien problem of the mid-1940's and 1950's," wrote the Congressional Research Service in a 1980 report.
- In the 1950s and 1960s, senior law enforcement officials in the U.S. Border Patrol and elsewhere in the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) understood and promoted the use of market forces to reduce illegal immigration and control the Southwest border. A February 1958 Border Patrol document from the El Centro (California) district states, "Should Public Law 78 be repealed or a restriction placed on the number of braceros allowed to enter the United States, we can look forward to a large increase in the number of illegal alien entrants into the United States."

- When at a Congressional hearing in the 1950s, a top INS official was asked what would happen to illegal immigration if the bracero program ended, he replied, "We can't do the impossible, Mr. Congressman."
  - From 1964 — when the bracero program ended — to 1976, INS apprehensions increased from 86,597 to 875,915 — *a more than 1000 percent increase*, indicating a significant rise in illegal immigration. Additional factors in illegal immigration rising during this period included economic conditions in Mexico and the lack of a useable temporary visa category for lesser skilled non-agricultural jobs. But an internal INS report found that apprehensions of adult male Mexican agricultural workers increased by 600 percent between 1965 and 1970, which helped demonstrate the effect terminating the bracero program had on illegal immigration.
  - The evidence indicates that a reasonable enforcement deterrent at the border is necessary to enable a temporary worker program such as the bracero program to reduce illegal entry. Yet the evidence is also clear that enforcement alone has not proven effective in reducing illegal immigration. INS enforcement did not grow weaker after the 1960 curtailing of the bracero program or after the program's subsequent demise in December 1964. And both after 1960 and 1964, without the legal safety valve that the bracero program represented, illegal immigration increased substantially.
- The current temporary worker visa category for agriculture, which U.S. employers consider burdensome and litigation-prone, fails to attract a sufficient number of participants to be part of the solution to illegal migration. While the bracero program has been criticized, that does not mean that it is impossible to devise a temporary worker program that takes into account the needs of both workers and employers — and performs the task of reducing illegal immigration by providing legal, market-based alternatives to the illegal entry that we see today on the Southwest border of the United States. □

“Illegal immigration was brought to a halt in the mid-1950s by a greatly increased law enforcement effort on the part of the U.S. Government, combined with a subsequent expansion of the bracero program as a substitute legal means of entry,” reported the Congressional Research Service in a 1980 report.<sup>1</sup>

An understanding that the bracero program played a key role in reducing illegal immigration has remained absent in the debate over both immigration policy and agricultural guest workers. Operating from 1942-1964, the bracero program allowed the admission of Mexican farm workers to be employed as seasonal contract labor for U.S. growers and farmers.<sup>2</sup> Today, the idea of allowing regulated, legal entry to fulfill a labor demand that is now filled by individuals entering illegally is viewed, depending on one’s viewpoint, as either novel, radical, or bold.

The irony is that in the 1950s and 1960s, senior law enforcement officials in the U.S. Border Patrol and elsewhere in the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) understood and promoted the use of market forces to reduce illegal immigration and control the Southwest border. Although the U.S. government permitted the admission of Mexican farm workers prior to 1954, a combination of limited enforcement, the almost immediate conversion to lawful bracero status

of many who entered illegally near the Mexican border for farm work, along with other factors, provided little deterrent to illegal entry.<sup>3</sup>

A controversial crackdown on illegal immigration in 1954, dubbed Operation Wetback, rounded up Mexican migrants, including some U.S. citizens and others in the country legally and deported them to Mexico. INS data show a 200,000 jump in apprehensions from 885,587 in 1953 to 1,089,583 in 1954.<sup>4</sup> Some aspects of Operation Wetback, while a break in intensity from previous INS operations, were not dissimilar from Border Patrol practices accepted today, such as the use of manned aircraft to alert teams on the ground as to the location of aliens. Other tactics, including “sweeps” in urban areas, would likely raise civil rights concerns today, although it appears that INS personnel made the vast majority of its apprehensions during Operation Wetback in rural, rather than urban areas, and primarily in Texas and California.<sup>5</sup>

Less well known, is that INS Commissioner (General) Joseph Swing preceded Operation Wetback by cultivating support among growers to replace an illegal and, therefore, unpredictable source of labor with a legal, regulated labor supply. Swing wanted growers to more heavily utilize the legal means afforded by the bracero program, which grew from a World War II emergency program to a bilateral agreement

with Mexico later extended and sanctioned through Congressional action.

Despite the view that employers preferred hiring people here illegally, in fact, Swing received favorable press from growers and in Congress for pushing the substitution of legal for illegal workers.<sup>6</sup> In 1955, General Swing said, "Net results of farmer-grower cooperation (with the INS) include a shoring up of the agricultural economy of the Southwest, and establishment of a dependable source of qualified agricultural labor."<sup>7</sup>

INS law enforcement personnel understood the role the bracero program played controlling the border. A February 1958 Border Patrol document from the El Centro (California) district states, "Should Public Law 78 be repealed or a restriction placed on the number of braceros allowed to enter the United States, we can look forward to a large increase in the number of illegal alien entrants into the United States."<sup>8</sup>

In April 1958, after the Mexican government asked for the removal of a large farm association in the Rio Grande Valley, the Border Patrol in Brownsville, Texas explicitly connected preventing employers from hiring through legal means to a predictable increase in illegal migration. In objecting to the prohibition on the association, the Border Patrol memo explains, "It (the farm association) has about 1,700 members


in the four Valley counties which it supplies braceros and has handled an estimated 35,000 braceros during the current season. Revocation of this association's certificate would result in an acute shortage of agricultural labor and offer employment to illegal entrants."<sup>9</sup>

Even when INS officials wanted to credit their own actions rather than the existence of a marked-based legal avenue of entry for farm workers they could not. Describing testimony before the House Committee on Agriculture by James Hennessy, Executive Assistant to Commissioner Swing, author Kitty Calavita writes, "While Hennessy at first insisted that INS enforcement policies be given full credit for both the reduction of illegal aliens and the subsequent expansion of the Bracero Program, he was ultimately forced to admit that control of the border was in large part the *consequence* of an amply supply of bracero labor." When Hennessy was asked what would happen to illegal immigration if the bracero program ended, he replied, "We can't do the impossible, Mr. Congressman."<sup>10</sup>

Indeed, it appears that when the bracero program ended in December 1964, Congress did begin asking the INS to do the impossible – stop or significantly halt illegal immigration without the use of sufficient legal avenues to meet the demand for labor in the United States.

FIGURE 1

APPREHENSIONS & BRACERO ADMISSIONS 1953 -1959



Source: Congressional Research Service, Temporary Worker Programs: Background and Issues. A report prepared at the request of Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, United States

Senate, for the use of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, February 1980, p. 40; Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1959; INS Statistical Yearbook 1996.

**DID THE BRACERO PROGRAM REDUCE ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION?**

While contemporaneous statements by INS officials indicate that those involved in day-to-day immigration operations believed the bracero

program was crucial for controlling the border, do the data support their conclusions? The record indicates the answer is "yes."

"Despite their limitations, then, as now, INS apprehension figures are the best available

indication of the degree of illegal immigration,” notes the Congressional Research Service.<sup>11</sup>

As noted, it is recognized that the number of INS apprehensions are an important indicator of the illegal flow and that, in general, apprehension numbers drop when the flow of illegal immigration decreases. (Conversely, the more apprehensions, the greater the flow of illegal immigration.) This is related to a deterrent effect whereby fewer attempts are made if the chances of success decrease or alternative choices are available to would-be border crossers. Law enforcement, market conditions, and the availability of legal means of entry can all affect the illegal flow.

As Figure 1 shows, after the 1954 enforcement actions and the increase in the use of the bracero program, INS apprehensions fell from the 1953 level of 885,587 to as low as 45,336 in 1959 — *a 95 percent reduction*.<sup>12</sup>

During that time, the annual number of Mexican farm workers legally admitted had doubled or more than doubled from 201,380 in 1953 to 398,650 in 1955, and an average of 437,937 for the years 1956-1959.<sup>13</sup> In addition, the number of Mexicans admitted as permanent residents (green card holders) increased from 18,454 in 1953 to an average of 42,949 between 1955 and 1959. It appears a good portion of those who received permanent visas were petitioned for by their agricultural employers, which was later limited by the federal government.<sup>14</sup>


Even tampering with the bracero program increased illegal immigration. In 1960, under pressure from labor unions and some members of Congress, the U.S. Department of Labor ended the “Special Program” that allowed through a streamlined process for growers to designate specific workers with whom they wished to contract. Years before, INS Commissioner Swing had praised the Special Program, saying it “served to eliminate the situation under which the busy farmer and grower was faced with the prospect of using anonymous workers selected for him by a government agency.”<sup>15</sup>

The Department of Labor’s action soon led to a decline in bracero admissions — and an increase in illegal immigration. (See Figure 2.) While bracero admissions fell by approximately 30 percent between 1959 and 1960, INS apprehensions rose 55 percent during the same period. As rules governing the admission of braceros continued to tighten annual INS apprehensions averaged 89,223 between 1961 and 1964, an increase of 46 percent over the 1956-59 average of 61,106. Connected to this, annual bracero admissions averaged 212,750 for 1961-64, a drop of 51 percent from the 1956-59 average of 437,937.

The data are equally telling on the rise of illegal immigration after bracero admissions ended in 1964. From 1964 — the last year of the bracero program — to 1976, INS apprehensions increased from 86,597 to 875,915 — *a more than 1000 percent increase*. Not all of this increase can be attributed to the bracero program ending. The state of the

**FIGURE 2**

INCREASE IN ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION FOLLOWING DECLINE IN BRACERO ADMISSIONS AFTER 1960 DOL REFORMS & SUBSEQUENT BRACERO PROGRAM TERMINATION



Source: Congressional Research Service, Temporary Worker Programs: Background and Issues. A report prepared at the request of Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, United

States Senate, for the use of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, February 1980, p. 40; Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1959; INS Statistical Yearbook 1996.

Mexican economy and, importantly, the lack of legal avenues for individuals to enter legally and work in service, construction or landscaping industries also contributed to the rise in illegal immigration. But an internal INS report found

that apprehensions of adult male Mexican agricultural workers increased by 600 percent between 1965 and 1970, which helped demonstrate the effect terminating the bracero program had on illegal immigration.<sup>16</sup> The 1970 INS annual report,

a public document, confirmed that the end of the bracero program accompanied sharp rises in illegal immigration: "Since the expiration of the Mexican Agriculture Act on December 31, 1964, the number of deportable aliens located has continued on an upward climb. For the 6-year period, FY 1965 through FY 1970, 71 percent of the 1,251,466 total deportable aliens located were of Mexican nationality. Year by year, the annual percentage of this nationality group has risen, from 50 percent in 1965 to 80 percent this year."<sup>17</sup>

Why did the end of the bracero program result in vastly increased illegal immigration? Those who examined the issue only years before understood this would be a logical outcome of eliminating a reliable, legal path to entry. A 1954 House report concluded: "Reason clearly indicates that if a Mexican who wants to come to the United States for this employment can enter this country legally, with all the protection and benefits that a well-considered and well-administered employment program give him he will do so, rather than come in illegally..." The report goes on to note: "If, because the program is not available or is not realistically geared to the requirements of employers or workers, the Mexican seeking employment finds it's impossible or difficult to come in legally, many of them will find their own way across the long border between the United States and Mexico and get employment where they can, under whatever wages and working conditions they are able to obtain."<sup>18</sup>

## COUNTERVAILING ARGUMENTS

The data and contemporaneous analyses are so strong that it is difficult to dispute the beneficial impact the bracero program had on limiting illegal immigration. However, some countervailing arguments have emerged.


One argument is that while the bracero program certainly limited illegal immigration it also encouraged illegal entry by establishing a dependence on Mexican labor and creating employment networks among Mexicans at home and in the United States. There is valid data that show apprehensions increased from 11,715 in 1943 to 31,174 in 1944 and to 193,657 in 1947. However, to blame this on the still sparsely used bracero program misses the point.

Only an average of 43,079 Mexicans were admitted each year on the bracero program from 1943 to 1947. Apprehensions fell well below the 1947 level once the program was more fully utilized. One reason relatively few Mexicans used the bracero program is that "the INS...legalized on the spot illegal Mexican immigrants found employed in agriculture and contracted them to their employers as braceros. During the summer of 1947 the service legalized 55,000 undocumented workers in Texas alone."<sup>19</sup>

On-the-spot conversion into the bracero program combined with frustration with dealing with the

FIGURE 3

INCREASE IN ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION: APPREHENSIONS AFTER THE END OF THE BRACERO PROGRAM (1964-1976)



Source: INS Statistical Yearbook 1996.

Mexican government during the early days of the program, encouraged migrants simply to cross on their own, seemingly helping to explain the higher apprehension figures. Two aspects of the poor design of the initial bracero system explain the problem: 1) At first, Mexico limited bracero admissions to less than 50,000 annually, and 2)

Texas, a large part of the agricultural labor market, was barred initially from using braceros.

More importantly, and perhaps a more obvious point, is that the bracero program became established during World War II and was later extended because of the demand for farm labor

and the willingness of Mexicans to supply the labor. It is a large counterfactual assumption to posit if only there had not been a bracero program, then American growers would not have experienced demand for farm labor. Nor is it plausible to assert that this demand would have been filled domestically. The civilian unemployment rate in the United States was 3.8 percent in 1948. While the unemployment rate fluctuated over the next 16 years, it averaged 4.7 percent from 1948 to 1964.<sup>20</sup> It seems implausible at best to argue that native U.S. labor would have filled the jobs on the farms if no Mexicans entered either legally or illegally during this period.

Even a critic of the bracero program, Cornell University Professor Vernon Briggs, who argues that bracero admissions later encouraged illegal migration, noted, "By the same token, however, it is simplistic to conclude that the problem would not eventually have surfaced in the absence of the bracero program."<sup>21</sup>

Another argument is that INS enforcement efforts should be at least partly credited for the reduction in illegal immigration, specifically Operation Wetback. No one argues that a temporary worker program without any law enforcement deterrent would reduce illegal migration to the United States. Moreover, it is clear that a stronger immigration law enforcement action was necessary in 1954 in order to encourage both employers and potential

employees that they should avail themselves of the legal system that the bracero program provided. (Whether Operation Wetback in all of its forms was necessary would be a more controversial assertion.)

The lack of border enforcement operations at first limited the effectiveness of the bracero program in reducing illegal immigration, as evidenced by the increase in apprehensions from 458,000 in 1950 to 875,000 in 1953, despite increases in bracero admissions. (Note, however, that from 1949 to 1950 when bracero admissions fell by 37 percent, apprehensions increased significantly.) In addition to the continuation of the almost automatic conversion to a bracero among many of those found illegally in the country by Border Patrol agents, it was not until 1954 that a more significant law enforcement deterrent emerged. "During the period 1941-52, the INS Border Patrol had been cut by 350 officers, while apprehensions increased by 4,000 percent. This changed in 1954 when the decision was made within the executive branch to increase the border patrol and attempt to get control of the situation," explains the Congressional Research Service.<sup>22</sup>

The evidence indicates that a reasonable enforcement deterrent at the border is necessary to enable a temporary worker program such as the bracero program to reduce illegal immigration. Yet the evidence is also clear that enforcement

alone has not proven effective in reducing illegal immigration. INS enforcement did not grow weaker after the 1960 curtailing of the bracero program or after the program's subsequent demise in December 1964. And both after 1960 and 1964, without the legal safety valve that the bracero program represented, illegal immigration increased substantially.

## CONCLUSION

The evidence is clear: By providing a legal path to entry for Mexican farm workers the bracero program significantly reduced illegal entry into the United States. The end of the bracero program in 1964 and its curtailment in 1960 saw the beginning of the increases in illegal immigration that we see up to the present day.

While it is beyond the scope of this paper to address current legislation related to agricultural guest workers, a few observations about the relevance of this study's findings to the present are warranted.

First, the current guest worker visa category attracts an insufficient number of participants to be part of a solution to illegal migration. As Table 1 shows fewer than 30,000 H-2A visas were used in FY2003, compared to the 300,000 to 445,000 range of annual bracero admissions between 1954 and 1960. (See Appendix.)

Why are admissions in the H-2A category so low? A good summary of employers' complaints about H-2A comes from a surprising source, a former DOL official. "The program is indeed cumbersome and litigation-prone. Employers must wade through a regulatory maze in order to achieve some sort of basic understanding of what is required of them," testified John R. Hancock, the Department of Labor's Chief of Agricultural Certification Unit responsible for administration of the H-2 program, before a 1997 House Immigration Subcommittee hearing. "The current program with its multiple regulations and related requirements is too complex for the average grower to comprehend and use without the aid of a good lawyer or experienced agent. The H-2A program is not currently a reliable mechanism to meet labor needs in situations where domestic workers are not available."<sup>23</sup>

Would current legislation on agricultural guest workers solve these problems? Judging from the support for the bills from agriculture and grower organizations those groups themselves believe that reforms that address litigation, wage rates, and a streamlined hiring process would, at minimum, significantly increase the ability and desire of employers to hire individuals on H-2A visas.

Second, another area of the study's findings relates to the nature of the bracero program, which has developed a pejorative tone in some circles. Whatever the faults of the bracero program, it

annually attracted up to 445,000 individuals a year who voluntarily chose to enter the United States and work under its rules.<sup>24</sup> Relatively few in comparison chose the option of entering the United States illegally to obtain work in agriculture. While it is argued that bracero admissions harmed domestic agricultural workers, it is not convincing that the situation of domestic workers improved once they competed against those entering illegally, rather than those who entered under the legal strictures of the bracero program.

Of course, even if the bracero program could have been more worker-friendly does not mean that it is impossible to devise a temporary worker program that sufficiently takes into account the needs of both workers and employers. Unlike the bracero program, current legislation that reforms the H-2A visa category is supported by both the United Farm Workers union and national agricultural organizations.

Relying on immigration law enforcement alone to reduce or control illegal immigration has proven unsuccessful. While some would argue sufficiently tough immigration enforcement, particularly in the country's interior, has not been tried, the number of authorized U.S. Border Patrol Agents has increased from 3,600 in 1990 to 10,000 in 2003. Meanwhile illegal immigration to the United States rose by 5.5 million between 1990 and 2000.<sup>25</sup> Border Patrol levels today are approximately 7 to 10 times

the level of the 1950s when illegal immigration was relatively low during the height of the bracero program.

It is difficult to argue that current approaches, or even more hardened versions of them hold sufficient prospects for success to ignore an approach that proved so successful in the past. "Without question, the bracero program was . . . instrumental in ending the illegal alien problem of the mid-1940's and 1950's," wrote the Congressional Research Service. "It should be noted that throughout its duration, and particularly during the 1950's, one of the major arguments used in support of the bracero program was that it offered an alternative and, therefore, at least a partial solution to the illegal alien problem."<sup>26</sup>

APPENDIX

TABLE 1

H-2A AGRICULTURAL WORK VISAS ISSUED BY FISCAL YEAR

FISCAL YEAR	H-2A VISAS ISSUED
2003	29,882
2002	31,538
2001	31,523
2000	30,200
1999	28,560
1998	22,676
1997	16,011
1996	11,004
1995	8,379
1994	7,721

Source: U.S. Department of State

TABLE 2

INS APPREHENSIONS AND BRACERO ADMISSIONS: 1942-1966

YEAR	APPREHENSIONS	BRACERO ADMISSIONS
1942	11,784	4,203
1943	11,715	52,098
1944	31,174	62,170
1945	69,164	49,454
1946	99,591	32,043
1947	193,657	19,632
1948	192,657	35,345
1949	288,253	107,000
1950	468,339	67,500
1951	509,040	192,000
1952	528,815	197,100
1953	885,587	201,380
1954	1,089,583	309,033
1955	254,096	398,850
1956	87,696	445,197
1957	59,918	436,049
1958	53,474	432,857
1959	45,336	437,643
1960	70,684	315,846
1961	88,823	291,420
1962	92,758	194,978
1963	88,712	186,865
1964	86,597	177,736
1965	110,371	0
1966	138,520	0

Source: Congressional Research Service, Temporary Worker Programs: Background and Issues. A report prepared at the request of Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, for the use of the Select

Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, February 1980, p. 40; Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1959; INS Statistical Yearbook 1996

# THE IMPACT OF AGRICULTURAL GUEST WORKER PROGRAMS

**TABLE 3**


**MEXICANS ADMITTED FOR PERMANENT RESIDENCE: 1940-1971**

YEAR	NO. ADMITTED	YEAR	NO. ADMITTED
1940	1,914	1956	65,047
1941	2,068	1957	49,154
1942	2,182	1958	26,712
1943	3,985	1959	23,061
1944	6,399	1960	32,684
1945	6,455	1961	41,632
1946	6,805	1962	55,291
1947	7,775	1963	55,253
1948	8,730	1964	32,967
1949	7,977	1965	37,969
1950	6,841	1966	45,163
1951	6,372	1967	42,371
1952	9,600	1968	43,563
1953	18,454	1969	44,623
1954	37,456	1970	44,469
1955	50,772	1971	50,103

Source: Kitty Calavita, *Inside the State*, Routledge, Chapman, and Hall, Inc., New York, 1992, p. 218.

**FIGURE 4**

APPREHENSIONS AND BRACERO ADMISSIONS: 1942-1966



Source: Congressional Research Service, Temporary Worker Programs: Background and Issues. A report prepared at the request of Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, United

States Senate, for the use of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, February 1980, p. 40; Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1959; INS Statistical Yearbook 1996.

## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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Stuart Anderson, Executive Director of the National Foundation for American Policy, served as Executive Associate Commissioner for Policy and Planning and Counselor to the Commissioner at the Immigration and Naturalization Service from August 2001 to January 2003. He spent four and a half years on Capitol Hill on the Senate Immigration Subcommittee, first for Senator Spencer Abraham and then as Staff Director of the subcommittee for Senator Sam Brownback. Prior to that, Stuart was Director of Trade and Immigration Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C., where he produced reports on the military contributions of immigrants and the role of immigrants in high technology. He has an M.A. from Georgetown University and a B.A. in Political Science from Drew University. Stuart has published articles in the *Wall Street Journal*, *New York Times*, *Los Angeles Times*, and other publications.

**NATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR  
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Started in 2003, the National Foundation for American Policy (NFAP) is a non-profit, non-partisan organization dedicated to public policy research on trade, immigration, education, and other issues of national importance. Its Advisory Board members include Columbia University economist Jagdish Bhagwati, Ohio University economist Richard Vedder, former INS Commissioner Jim Ziglar, Rep. Guy Vander Jagt (ret.), Cesar Conda, until recently Vice President Dick Cheney's chief domestic policy adviser, and former Reagan and Bush Administration official Jim Pitts.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Congressional Research Service, *Temporary Worker Programs: Background and Issues*. A report prepared at the request of Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, for the use of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, February 1980, p. 40.

<sup>2</sup>"The bracero program falls into three distinct phases: The wartime period, which extended 2 years beyond the end of World War II, until the expiration of the special authorizing legislation in 1947; the post-war transition period from 1948 until the enactment of new authorizing legislation, Public Law 78, in 1951; and the Public Law 78 period, during which the program expanded until 1960, followed by a phase-down until its termination at the end of 1964," explains the Congressional Research Service. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 31. An estimated 142,000 Mexicans were legalized in the country as braceros and placed under contract from 1947-1949. There are no figures available for later years.

<sup>4</sup>U.S. Department of Justice, *Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service*, 1959.

<sup>5</sup>Congressional Research Service (February 1980), p. 41, citing the 1955 INS Annual Report.

<sup>6</sup>The reaction of California growers, according to the head of the California Farm Placement Service, was as follows: "Employers using legally contracted Mexicans welcomed 'Operation Wetback'. It relieved them from the unfairness they had felt in adhering to the wage, housing, and other regulations governing the legal use of Mexicans, while their neighbors using wet backs [sic] were not subject to such regulations." Edward F. Hayes, Richard H. Salter, Roy Plumlee, Robert B. Lindsey, "Operation 'Wetback' – Impact on the Border States," *Employment Security Review*, vol. 22, (March 1955), pp. 16-21, as cited in Kitty Calavita, *Inside the State*, Routledge, Chapman, and Hall, Inc., New York, 1992, p. 60.

<sup>7</sup>Immigration and Naturalization Service, *I and N Reporter*, 1955, p. 16, as cited in Calavita, p. 72.

<sup>8</sup>Monthly Sector Activity Reports (MSAR), El Centro, California, February 1958, Accession 63A1359, Box 3, as cited in Calavita, p. 83.

<sup>9</sup>MSAR Brownsville, Texas, April 1958, Accession 63A1359, Box 4, as cited in Calavita, p. 84.

<sup>10</sup>U.S. Congress, House Committee on Agriculture, Subcommittee on Equipment, Supplies, and Manpower, 1958, p. 450, cited in Calavita, p. 85.

<sup>11</sup>Congressional Research Service (February 1980), p. 36.

<sup>12</sup>*Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service*, 1959.

<sup>13</sup>Congressional Research Service, February 1980.

<sup>14</sup>Calavita, p. 218.

<sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 93.

<sup>16</sup>Unpublished INS report, October 21, 1971, CO 214h, as cited in Calavita, p. 151.

<sup>17</sup>U.S. Department of Justice, *Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service*, 1970, p.11, as cited in Congressional Research Service (February 1980), p. 57.

<sup>18</sup>Congressional Research Service (February 1980), pp. 41-42.

<sup>19</sup>Calavita, p. 24.

<sup>20</sup>*Economic Report of the President*, February 1994, Table B-40, p. 314.

<sup>21</sup>Congressional Research Service (February 1980), p. 58.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 40. The evidence indicates that during this period the Border Patrol was large enough to apprehend large numbers of people but not sufficiently manned to send the signals to deter large numbers from attempting illegal entry in the first place.

<sup>23</sup>Testimony of John R. Hancock, Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims of House Committee on the Judiciary, September 24, 1997.

<sup>24</sup>In an October 2003 poll of Latino registered voters released by WCVI-MirRam Group, Latinos were asked, "How would you describe the bracero program?" In reply, 61% agreed with the statement that it was "A useful program that provided Mexican workers with jobs and filled labor shortages in the U.S." Only 23% described it as an exploitative program.

<sup>25</sup>*Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: 1990 to 2000*, Immigration and Naturalization Service, January 2003.

<sup>26</sup>Congressional Research Service, (February 1980), p. 41.

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